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Abstract - Child marriage is a human rights violation according to various 
international agreements and human rights conventions. In many countries the 
practice is outlawed, yet it persists with great incidence in both developed and 
developing societies. Governments must act to eliminate the practice which (1) results 
in physical and psychological individual harms for child brides; (2) perpetuates societal 
harms in the form of entrenched gender inequality and limited economic potential for 
women and for countries as a whole; (3) thrives on the exploitation of economic and 
agency vulnerabilities of a social class, namely young girls and women; and (4) 
threatens the agency and autonomy of market “participants,” thereby characterizing 
the market in child marriage as a “noxious market,” according to Debra Satz’s 
framework, in the strongest sense. To best respond to the harms and negative effects of 
the market, governments need to understand the reasons why the practice persists, 
even though it is illegal. Among the most cited motivators of child marriage are 
economic circumstance (i.e., poverty) and dated or unfounded beliefs relating to the 
economic potential of young girls and women. Governments can address these 
motivators, and thereby (begin to) eradicate the practice of child marriage, through 
improvements to and expansion of social welfare programs and through targeted 
educational initiatives which stress the economic opportunity available to and earnings 
potential of young girls. 
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Introduction 
 
 UNICEF defines child marriage as “any formal marriage or informal union 
between a child under the age of 18 and an adult or another child.”1 Child marriage is 
not only a violation of human rights according to international agreements and 
conventions like the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights2 and the 
UN’s Convention on the Rights of the Child,3 but it is also widely outlawed. Even so, 
the practice persists at alarming rates around the world, namely in South Asia and sub-
Saharan Africa. South Asia accounts for more than 40% of the global total of child 
marriages.4 Bangladesh, Nepal, and India are among the countries with the highest 
prevalence of child marriage in the world.5 The COVID-19 pandemic, in particular, 
has led to a spike in child marriage in parts of India. Data from the western Indian 
state of Maharashtra shows that officials halted over 200 child marriages between 
April and August of 2020, whereas only about half that number were halted in the 
previous 12 months.6 In sub-Saharan Africa, meanwhile, UNICEF reports that 37% 
of women marry before the age of 18; more than two-thirds of women in Niger and 
Chad marry before they turn 18.7 While I’ve highlighted a few of the regions in which 
the market is most prevalent, child marriage is undoubtedly a global phenomenon 
which permeates developed and developing nations, alike. In what follows, I will 
focus on the cases in which a female child (under the age of 18) is forced to marry an 
adult male (often much older), as such cases are not only more prevalent, but are also 
considered to be more harmful and problematic.8 
 In this paper, I argue that the pervasive market in child marriage satisfies each 
of the four parameters of noxious markets offered by Debra Satz. After a brief 
 
1 “Child Marriage,” UNICEF, September 2020, https://www.unicef.org/protection/child-marriage. 
2 “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” United Nations, accessed November 5, 2020, 
https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/. 
3 “Convention on the Rights of the Child,” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, accessed 
November 5, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx. 
4 “Fast Facts: 10 facts illustrating why we must #EndChildMarriage,” UNICEF, February 11, 2019, 
https://www.unicef.org/eca/press-releases/fast-facts-10-facts-illustrating-why-we-must-
endchildmarriage. 
5 Deepali Gohda, David Hotchkiss, and Anastasia Gage, “Association Between Child Marriage and 
Reproductive Health Outcomes and Service Utilization: A Multi-Country Study from South Asia,” 
Journal of Adolescent Health 52 (January 2013): 554. https://cdn.icmec.org. 
6 Lauren Frayer and Sushmita Pathak, “Child Marriages Are Up In The Pandemic. Here’s How India 
Tries To Stop Them,” last modified November 5, 2020, 
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/11/05/931274119/child-marriages-are-up-in-
the-pandemic-heres-how-india-tries-to-stop-them. 
7 “Child marriage around the world,” UNICEF, March 11, 2020, 
https://www.unicef.org/stories/child-marriage-around-world. 
8 “Child Marriage,” UNICEF, September 2020, https://www.unicef.org/protection/child-marriage. 
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description of Satz’s conception of noxious markets, I will analyze the distinct harms 
resulting from the institution, or practice, of child marriage which contribute to its 
noxiousness. These harms include physiological and psychological harms imposed on 
the children, or individuals, involved, deepened gender inequalities and the 
perpetuation of poverty in society, the exploitation of (primarily economic) 
vulnerabilities, and threats to the agency of the market’s “participants.” Then, I will 
examine what I take to be a few of the primary economic motivations for child 
marriage, namely economic circumstance (i.e., poverty) and false prudential beliefs, 





 Broadly, Debra Satz describes a “noxious market” as a system which 
undermines the conditions necessary for individuals to act and transact as equals.9 
More specifically, and perhaps more importantly, Satz describes four parameters 
which characterize noxious markets. The first two parameters Satz offers relate to the 
outcomes of such markets. First, noxious markets can produce harmful outcomes for 
individuals.10 Markets which satisfy this parameter might impose physical harms onto 
participants or otherwise affect their general welfare, for example. Second, noxious 
markets can produce outcomes which are harmful at the societal level.11 Markets 
which produce this outcome might undermine democratic institutions or threaten 
equality in society through institutions which promote servility. The second set of 
these parameters offered by Satz relates to the conditions of some agents or 
participants within the market (i.e., the noxiousness stems from the “source” of the 
market). With this in mind, Satz’s third parameter of noxious markets states that such 
markets can be characterized by weak agency and asymmetric knowledge among some 
or many of its participants.12 This can occur when market participants are given 
incomplete or faulty information about the risks and consequences associated with 
participation in a market, or when someone enters a market on another individual’s 
behalf. Finally, the fourth parameter she sets forth in characterizing noxious markets 
states that such markets can exploit relevant vulnerabilities of some or many 
participants in the market.13 Markets in which participants have vastly unequal needs 
 
9 Debra Satz, Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets (New York, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 94. 
10 Satz, 94. 
11 Satz, 95. 
12 Satz, 96. 
13 Satz, 97. 
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and demands for a certain good, or in which agents’ poverty is exploited, would 
illustrate this characteristic. Now, I will identify some of the distinct harms resulting 
from the institution of child marriage as they relate to these parameters and will 
describe how the market in child marriage qualifies as a noxious market in the 
strongest sense. 
 
Child Marriage as a Noxious Market 
 
 The market in child marriage leads to many deeply destructive harms which 
correspond to Satz’s aforementioned conditions of noxious markets. In this section, I 
argue that each of the four parameters, or “dimensions,”14 detailed above are satisfied 
in the market in child marriage. First, I will explore the harms incurred onto the 
individual “participants” in the market. 
 
i. Individual Harms 
 
Child marriage invokes a sense of moral repugnance for many in the Western 
world, who often cite a lack of consent, or agency, as an offending aspect of the 
practice. While this is certainly a disturbing aspect of the market (and one which I will 
explore in detail), there also exist resulting harms which are far more tangible/salient. 
As described above, the “individual harms” characteristic of noxious markets refers to 
the outcomes resulting from participation in a market which produce destitution or 
other harms to the basic welfare or agency interests of the relevant market’s 
participants.15 I will first describe some of the prevalent physical harms associated with 
child marriage and will then delve into the distinct psychological harms stemming from 
the practice. 
 Young girls entered into marriage experience myriad physical harms, including 
harms relating to domestic abuse, early sexual activity, and early pregnancy. Even 
though many children are entered into marriage with the intention of protecting them 
from violence and harassment,16 girls married before the age of 18 are more likely to 
experience physical and sexual violence in their marriages than those who marry as 
adults.17 Lacking education, autonomy, and agency, child brides are not only 
particularly vulnerable to domestic abuse, but they are also more likely to believe that 
 
14 Satz, 98. 
15 Satz, 98. 
16 Jennifer Parsons et al., “Economic Impacts of Child Marriage: A Review of the Literature,” The 
Review of Faith and International Affairs 13, no. 3 (October 2015): 16. https://www.tandfonline.com.  
17 K.G. Santhya et al., “Associations Between Early Marriage and Young Women's Marital and 
Reproductive Health Outcomes: Evidence from India,” International Perspectives on Sexual and 
Reproductive Health 36, no. 3 (September 2010): 135. https://www-jstor-org.proxy.library.upenn.edu/.  
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such treatment is somehow justified.18 I will explore this idea further in the next 
subsection, on societal harms. 
 Early brides are often expected and pressured to have children soon after 
marriage. In this way, the right to not engage in sexual activity and the freedom to 
decide if and when to reproduce are largely absent in child marriages.19 This 
represents a harm to the agency interests of these young girls and is also the root 
cause of the numerous physical and reproductive harms experienced by early brides. 
With their weakened (or complete lack of) agency, child brides are more susceptible to 
early and unprotected sex than women who marry after turning eighteen, putting 
them at increased risk of sexually transmitted and other diseases, like HIV, as well as 
early pregnancy. Not having the physiological maturity or capacity to healthily birth 
children so early, adolescent mothers face increased risks during pregnancy, too, 
including higher rates of eclampsia (convulsions caused by high blood pressure in 
pregnant women), postpartum hemorrhage, sepsis, obstructed labor, and maternal 
mortality (pregnancy-related death), among others.20 Those who are fortunate enough 
to survive early pregnancy often deal with lasting physical and reproductive health 
issues.  
Additionally, adolescent mothers are much more likely to deliver preterm or 
low-birthweight infants than mothers over the age of 19. Worse, infant mortality rates 
are 60% higher when the mother is younger than eighteen. Once again, such issues 
and risks are largely due to the physical immaturity of these adolescent mothers. 
Additionally, poor nutrition, decreased access to medical and social services, and 
increased risk of disease contribute to these infant harms.21 There are certainly 
significant harms thrust onto early brides stemming from child marriage and early 
pregnancy, and additional harms are passed along to the children of these adolescent 
mothers. 
Child marriage also leads to deeply deleterious psychological harms. Even in 
places where child marriage is considered to be a norm, marrying early is strongly 
associated with negative psychological outcomes, including depression, anxiety, and 
other mechanisms of psychological distress.22 Furthermore, young girls participating 
in the market are outrightly denied their childhood. Immediately following their 
 
18 Santhya et al., 136. 
19 UNICEF, “Early Marriage: Child Spouses,” Innocenti Digest 7 (March 2001): 9. 
https://www.unicef-irc.org/.  
20 Nawal Nour, “Child Marriage: A Silent Health and Human Rights Issue,” Reviews in Obstetrics and 
Gynecology 2, no. 1 (2009): 54. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/.  
21 Nour, 54. 
22 Neetu A. John et al., “Child marriage and psychological well-being in Niger and Ethiopia,” BMC 
Public Health 19 (2019): 1. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/.  
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marriage, many young girls are expected to fulfill the traditional roles of a wife, 
domestic worker, and—often soon after marriage—mother. Performing the duties 
often associated with these traditional roles so early in life denies these girls the 
opportunity to an education, as well as opportunities for social development among 
friends and family. As a result, many experience feelings of isolation and depression.23 
Children who attempt to flee their marriages (in an effort to avoid these harms) 
by returning home to their parents may be beaten and sent back to their husbands.24 
Elders in these communities are rarely sympathetic to the physical and psychological 
traumas experienced by girls through child marriage—many see these harms as an 
“unavoidable part of life.”25 This sentiment begins to illustrate some of the disturbing 
societal harms provoked by markets in child marriage, which I will explore next. 
 
ii. Societal Harms 
 
Generally, the market in child marriage promotes attitudes within societies 
which treat some individuals (young girls and women) as mere products, or property, 
rather than as beings worthy of respect and moral consideration. This perspective 
violates the liberal and democratic qualities which many of the aforementioned 
countries’ governments aim to promote (e.g., India and Bangladesh, among many 
others). 
As mentioned in the previous subsection, girls who marry early are more likely 
to experience physical abuse in their marriages. Even worse, early brides tend to 
believe wife-beating is “justified” more than those who marry after turning 18.26 This 
belief can be attributed to the pervasive gender inequality which is entrenched in 
many societies in which child marriage is prevalent. The continued practice of child 
marriage further imbeds these attitudes of inequality and confined gender roles. 
Because of child marriage, young girls and women are not granted the opportunity to 
interact as equals. Instead, they are conditioned “to be docile and servile” and are 
“shape[d]…into passive accepters of a status quo.”27 
This status quo not only threatens the liberties and human rights of young girls 
and women, but it has also been shown to result in deeper economic issues, not only 
for individuals, but also for society at large. Child marriage can significantly disrupt, 
 
23 Nour, 53-54.  
24 Sarah Leduc, “Bangladesh’s ‘Wedding buster’ takes on illegal child marriage,” last modified 
October 11, 2016, https://www.france24.com/en/20161011-bangladesh-child-marriages-
international-day-girl-child-radha-rani-sarker. 
25 UNICEF, “Early Marriage: Child Spouses,” Innocenti Digest 7 (March 2001): 9. 
https://www.unicef-irc.org/. 
26 Santhya et al., 136.  
27 Satz, 95. 
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and often put an end to, the educational path of young girls.28 The earlier a girl 
marries, the less schooling/education she can be expected to complete. The less 
schooling a girl completes, the less likely she is to develop skills (vocational, technical, 
etc.) necessary for participation in the labor force, the less she can be expected to earn 
across her lifetime, and the less likely she is to participate in political processes and 
discourse. The intergenerational practice of child marriage further reinforces this cycle 
of limited earning and political potential for a mother’s children (and her children’s 
children, and so on) and stunts a nation’s economic and GDP growth. 
With these limitations on earning potential and decision-making/agency, child 
brides become increasingly dependent on their husbands. This dependence 
undermines the concepts of equal treatment of and equal standing between persons in 
democratic societies. So, while the individual harms inflicted by child marriage are 
deeply disturbing and worrisome, governments should be particularly wary of the 





Satz writes that some markets highlight the vulnerabilities of one of the 
transacting parties.29 I argue that child marriage is an example of a market which not 
only survives, but thrives, off of one transacting party’s exploitation of the other’s 
economic and social vulnerabilities.  
As I will discuss in greater detail in the next section, poverty and related 
economic factors and beliefs are a primary motivator of child marriage’s continued 
practice. Young girls are viewed as mere economic burdens in many countries around 
the world. This motivates parents to marry off their daughters earlier. In their view, 
marriage not only offers a form of economic protection for their child, but also 
relieves parents of the financial burden imposed by a daughter and often results in 
direct economic payment for the girl’s family in the form of a bride wealth or bride 
price. Typically, the younger the child, the higher the payment and the sooner the 
economic burden is lifted. Similarly, where a dowry—a payment or transfer of assets 
from the bride’s family to the groom’s family—is required, young girls’ parents are 
incentivized to marry off their daughters at a younger age, as younger and less 
educated brides tend to require smaller dowries.30 
Poverty drives individuals and families to participate in the market in child 
marriage, and sheer economic need often dictates the terms at which the ‘transactions’ 
 
28 Parsons et al., 14.  
29 Satz, 97. 
30 Parsons et al., 13. 
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are made. I will illustrate this parameter of noxious markets with an unrelated 
example. Suppose a father falls on hard times. The father typically provides for his 
family, but with the recent loss of his job, he is unable to offer them financial support. 
To compensate for his and his family’s economic hardship, the father begins to sell 
old sports memorabilia, which he values greatly, to his neighbors. The neighbors, 
knowing that the father needs the money to feed himself and his family and has little 
room/capacity to negotiate, offer bids for these items which are well below market 
value. The father accepts these low bids because he knows he has no choice or 
alternative: he and his family need the money to live. Even though the exchange 
results in a relative improvement in his well-being (i.e., immediate cash payment), 
there is reason to believe that in another circumstance he would not have accepted the 
low-ball bids on these objects. Regardless, his conniving neighbors exploited his 
economic vulnerability to achieve maximal benefit from the transaction. The 
overarching point is this: economic vulnerabilities of families can dictate the terms at 
which “transactions” are performed within the market in child marriage. Economic 
need alone can dictate both the availability and price of young girls on the market, as 
parents act not necessarily in their or their children’s best interest, but in the interest 
of relative improvement in their financial status and well-being. 
Additionally, the effects of gender inequality and the general lack of agency 
among women in many of the aforementioned countries and regions result in further 
vulnerabilities. Young girls may be raised to believe that their status as women implies 
their participation in institutions such as child marriage. Girls who are taught to 
engage in these practices because they believe that it is an “unavoidable part of life” 
(or because they lack the agency and/or education to arrive at another conclusion) are 
exploited to satisfy the preferences and cultural practices of their families and their 
husbands/in-laws.  
 
iv. Weak Agency 
Finally, there also exist disturbing practices in the market in child marriage 
relating to the levels of agency of “participants” in the market. Thus far throughout 
this paper, I have decided to quote “participants” because many children entered into 
these markets are not willing participants. Instead, young girls are often coerced or 
forced into these unions by parents, guardians, or other authority figures in their lives. 
To me, the term “participant” implies a level of willingness or voluntariness when 
associated with involvement in a market. I want to be clear that this sense of 
voluntariness is often absent in child marriages.  
There is an obvious relationship between the lack of agency in markets in child 
marriage and the harms I have outlined above; the absence of individual autonomy in 
the market relates strongly to the aforementioned individual and societal 
consequences, in particular. I argue that there are two primary ways in which a child’s 
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levels of agency are threatened in this market. First, as mentioned above, children are 
often entered into markets in child marriage not by themselves, but by others—
typically parents or other family members—on their behalf. In fact, many children are 
given no choice in the matter; such cases are blatant, clear-cut examples of how 
“participant” agency, autonomy, and decision-making ability are not only weak, but 
completely absent in the market. 
Second, even if we accept that there are cases in which a child is not forced, 
coerced, or unknowingly entered into an early marriage (and certainly such cases 
exist), there is reason to believe that children are not given adequate information 
about the consequences of child marriage in such cases. 31 If a child were fully aware 
of the increased risk she faced with respect to physical abuse, psychological harm, and 
pregnancy/sexual health issues, or the economic and educational opportunity she 
would forfeit as a result of her willing entry into a premature marriage, she might be 
less willing to submit herself as an early bride. In cases in which a child is aware of 
these harms and consequences, suicide is common.32 So, even if a child exhibits full 
autonomy or decision-making ability with respect to her decision to marry early, her 
agency is not necessarily strong if full or adequate information regarding the 
consequences, dangers, and risks associated with her participation in the market is not 
disclosed.  
 Similarly, parents might convince their children that early marriage is their only 
option. Persuaded by social norms, cultural practices, religious traditions, and/or 
economic pressures, among other factors, parents weaken the agency of their children 
by failing to recognize, consider, and disclose easily available (and likely less harmful) 
alternatives to child marriage. 
 It is clear, then, that the market in child marriage qualifies as a noxious market 
in the strongest sense; as I argue above, each of Satz’s four conditions are satisfied by 
the market. So, how can governments and NGOs address this clearly problematic, yet 
seemingly elusive, issue? In what ways can policy solutions effectively mitigate not 
only the prevalence of the market, but also the effects of the harms I describe above? 
To (begin to) answer these questions, we must understand why child marriage 
happens, even when it is against the law. In the next section, I will examine one of the 
underlying motivations for the continued practice of child marriage and will offer 
ways in which governments and NGOs might effectively respond in this case. 
  
 
31 Satz, 98. As Satz writes here, inadequate information about the nature and consequences of a 
market depicts weak agency. 
32 “Child, early and forced marriage, including in humanitarian settings,” Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, accessed November 7, 2020, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Women/WRGS/Pages/ChildMarriage.aspx.  
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Economic Motivations of Child Marriage and their Policy 
Implications 
 
Even with the presence of laws prohibiting the practice around the world, child 
marriage is still a vastly prevalent practice driven largely by several underlying 
motivations and deeply held convictions. To understand the ways in which policy can 
effectively mitigate (and hopefully end) this harmful practice, policymakers must 
recognize these motivations. In what follows, I will explore the complexities of child 
marriage’s economic motivations. I will further detail the role of poverty and will 
describe the prudential (or economic) beliefs and attitudes which contribute to the 
continued prevalence of the market. I do not intend to suggest that these are the only 
motivations for child marriage, nor do I argue that these motivations are more 
important or more prevalent than others. Instead, I take these to be among the most 
commonly cited motivators of child marriage and I hope to offer insight with respect 
to the ways in which governments, NGOs, and other relevant stakeholders can more 
effectively address these economic motivations through policy solutions. 
 
i. Addressing Poverty 
 
Addressing the economic motivations of child marriage begins with addressing 
the issue of poverty. Studies show that in countries where poverty has decreased, so 
has the incidence of child marriage.33 Tackling poverty is undoubtedly a tall order, but 
governments worldwide have made significant strides in reducing the global 
prevalence of poverty by more than half since 2000.34 Governments can implement 
several policy and educational mechanisms to fully eradicate the intergenerational and 
perpetuating causes and effects of child marriage, including poverty, and to ensure 
that the transition away from child marriage is incentivized for young girls, their 
parents, and their families.  
One obvious way to address poverty in the context of child marriage is to make 
schooling not only more widely available and of higher quality for young girls, but also 
to make it compulsory. By mandating that young girls stay in school up to a certain 
age, governments are not only able to reduce the incidence of child marriage, but they 
are also able to increase a young girl’s (and her family’s) future expected earnings, 
lower the likelihood she experiences domestic violence during marriage, and increase 
her agency and decision-making ability. However, compulsory education is by no 
means an original suggestion; many countries, including those which struggle with 
child marriage the most, currently have laws which mandate that children attend 
 
33 Nour, 54. 
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school up to a certain age. But, in India, for example, that age is only fourteen.35 In 
Niger, fifteen. To stave off child marriage, these and other governments can raise the 
upper limit for compulsory education and more effectively enforce such laws. 
The United States, although not completely void of the practice, keeps child 
marriage incidence low not only because of its relatively successful effort to prevent 
poverty (in relation to many developing nations, at least), but also because of relatively 
high age requirements for compulsory school attendance. At minimum, U.S. states 
require children to remain in school until sixteen, while some require attendance until 
the age of eighteen.36 Countries which struggle with child marriage might consider 
raising their compulsory schooling ages to further discourage early/child marriage and 
to ensure that children are offered a higher minimum standard of educational 
opportunity while being able to develop adequate agency, decision-making skills, 
autonomy, and economic potential.  
In Niger, over half of children aged 7 to 16 are not enrolled in school, leaving 
the country among the lowest ranked in West Africa in terms of literacy rate.37 While 
there are a few reasons for this (including geographical gaps and economic barriers to 
education, which the government undoubtedly needs to address), the lack of 
community compliance with existing compulsory education/school-age laws is among 
the most concerning. To ensure compliance, governments might consider investments 
into a mandatory child registry to document child births and school records. Records 
would be required even—or perhaps particularly—in the most remote areas. The 
feasibility of such a program might be difficult to guarantee, but this registry—
coupled with cooperation from education officials, teachers, community leaders, and 
law enforcement—will exist to ensure that all children are enrolled in school until the 
prescribed age outlined in relevant school-age policies, at minimum. Frequent 
absences from or failure to attend school prior to being “of age” in accordance with 
legislation would result in fines and investigation. Fines can be pooled into a fund 
which feeds back into government investment in education systems and 
infrastructure, while investigations should comprise of police inquiry to ensure no 
child has been pre-maturely married. 
Furthermore, investments in the quality of education and in educational 
infrastructure (i.e., school buildings themselves) are necessary to combat child 
 




36 “Table 5.1.” National Center for Education Statistics, accessed December 3, 2020, 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/statereform/tab5_1.asp.  
37 “Education,” UNICEF, accessed December 1, 2020, https://www.unicef.org/niger/education.  
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marriage. As mentioned above, many children in Niger do not attend school due to 
wide geographical gaps in school sites. It is not a coincidence that Niger is ranked 
among the highest in the world in terms of incidence of child marriage. Additional 
school buildings and qualified teachers must be introduced to these areas to help. 
Additionally, India struggles with teacher truancy in its public schools.38 To adequately 
educate children, governments need to incentivize teachers by ensuring adequate 
funding for teacher salaries and investing in bearable workplace/classroom 
conditions. Creating government programs or funds to incentivize careers in primary 
and secondary education (through direct payment or university tuition subsidies, for 
example) and—once again—improving educational infrastructure are great ways to 
start. 
Education is a crucial ingredient for the eradication of both poverty and child 
marriage. Governments serious about eliminating the practice need to invest in state-
provided education systems while ensuring that children are attending school to 
decrease the likelihood and incidence of the practice and to maximize their economic 
opportunity. 
Countries might also consider increasing access to water sources, particularly in 
rural or otherwise remote areas. People, and particularly young girls and women, in 
developing nations spend hours walking to and from water sources each day. Not 
only is limited access to clean water responsible for health issues and diseases which 
bring about economic burdens for both individuals and governments (e.g., healthcare 
costs, lower earnings and levels of productivity, etc.), but the time spent acquiring this 
necessary good takes away from individuals’ being able to contribute to the labor 
force. This stifles earnings and economic potential, thereby contributing to the 
perpetuation of poverty and increasing the likelihood of child marriage. With 
improved infrastructure and access to clean water, individuals can live longer and 
more comfortably, and can better contribute to their country’s economy and their 
own earning potential. Partnerships with NGOs and charities which work to increase 
access to clean water—like ‘charity: water,’39 for example—can prove useful in 
promoting health and wellness in these communities, increasing productivity, and 
shifting public priorities from ‘Where can my family and I get clean water today?’ to 
‘Which job opportunity offers the greatest earning potential?’ 
Furthermore, although potentially controversial in practice, efforts to slow 
population growth can prove useful in both slowing the incidence of child marriage 
and decreasing the incidence of poverty. Child marriage provokes high levels of 
fertility; early brides become pregnant early and, on average, procreate in higher 
 
38 Geeta Anand, “Fighting Truancy Among India’s Teachers, With a Pistol and a Stick,” last 
modified February 19, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/20/world/asia/india-primary-
school-system-uttar-pradesh.html.  
39 “About Us,” charity: water, accessed December 3, 2020, https://www.charitywater.org/about.  
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incidence compared to women who marry and become mothers later in life.40 Families 
with more children carry greater economic burdens, as they require higher economic 
capacity to pay for food, education, healthcare, and other necessities for each of their 
children, thereby reducing their standard of living and perpetuating the cycle of 
poverty. Additionally, higher population levels increase the demand for social and 
welfare services from the government. While policies like China’s former one-child 
policy unquestionably carry moral baggage as potential human rights violations (I do 
not advocate for such a policy), countries struggling with child marriage, poverty, and 
population growth can implement positive incentives and robust family planning 
services to decrease population levels, thereby diminishing the likelihood of harms 
linked to early pregnancy, normalizing later pregnancy, and decreasing the prevalence 
of and pressures associated with child marriage.  
Expansions of programs similar to India’s Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana 
Yojana, which is a cash transfer benefits program for first-time mothers over the age of 
19,41 would serve as further incentive for young girls to delay pregnancy to adulthood. 
Limiting and disincentivizing early pregnancy (and thereby removing worries of 
pregnancy outside of wedlock) might also remove the social pressures surrounding 
child marriage for many families.  
Along these lines, governments can implement tax breaks, or even direct cash 
payments, for newly married couples in which the bride is over the age of eighteen, or 
for families who delay their daughter’s marriage until after she turns eighteen. In 
conjunction with greater oversight of marriage practices, these are a few ways in 
which governments can incentivize couples and families to delay marriage until 
adulthood.  
 Although fiscally daunting, governments might also explore the potential for a 
universal basic income (UBI) to stave off poverty and to address concerns of 
economic domination of one social class (in this case, men) over another (women). In 
conjunction with effective inflation control, UBIs can alleviate many of the economic 
pressures which families face, thereby decreasing the economic need and pressure for 
child marriage. Additionally, UBIs can decrease the dependence of young girls and 
their families on grooms and the institution of child marriage. However, a lack of 
evidence with respect to UBIs in practice means that there is not much empirical 
research to support its implementation, so developing nations and economies could 
 
40 Sanni Yaya et al., “Prevalence of child marriage and its impact on fertility outcomes in 34 sub-
Saharan African countries,” BMC International Health and Human Rights 19 (2019): 1. 
https://bmcinthealthhumrights.biomedcentral.com/.  
41 “Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana,” Ministry of Women and Child Development (Government of 
India: New Delhi), accessed November 30, 2020, 
https://wcd.nic.in/sites/default/files/FINAL%20PMMVY%20%28FAQ%29%20BOOKELT.pdf. 
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be understandably cautious in considering this option. To start, however, developing 
governments can experiment by implementing small-scale rollouts of UBI programs 
to impoverished and economically desperate communities first. This will immediately 
improve the economic status of the most vulnerable while serving as an experiment, 
of sorts, to test the effectiveness of such a policy initiative. 
 Addressing the issue of poverty in the context of child marriage rests heavily on 
increasing financial stability within communities, through increased individual 
purchasing power—or, in other words, more cash in the hands of individuals—and 
strengthening agency and economic potential through education. Historically, such 
governmental intervention and involvement have proven to be effective methods of 
economic recovery and poverty eradication. FDR’s welfare and public assistance 
programs rescued an economically depressed United States in the 1930s. Similar 
efforts by Park Chung-hee’s government lifted much of Korea out of poverty 
following years of widespread economic desperation and destitution resulting from 
the Korean War.42  Similar investments into institutional development will reap 
beneficial economic returns and will, in turn, help to lower the incidence of child 
marriage around the world. 
 
ii. Addressing False Economic Attitudes and Prudential Beliefs 
 
While poverty is a primary motivator of the continued practice of child 
marriage, the practice is also driven by dated and, frankly, incorrect economic 
attitudes and beliefs relating to the economic potential of young girls and women. As 
mentioned previously, girls are often seen as economic burdens for families, rather 
than as valuable members of communities and local economies. Such attitudes fail to 
recognize the economic potential for girls and women outside of marriage. To best 
address these, governments should not only introduce educational initiatives for girls, 
their families, and community leaders to alter the incorrect assumptions of female 
economic potential, but they should put forth concerted efforts aimed at increasing 
economic opportunity for women. 
Instilling in young girls and women a belief in their economic potential can 
greatly decrease the incidence of economic dependence of young girls on men, 
thereby strengthening the agency of these girls and reducing the likelihood of 
subordination, dependence, and abuse due to economic circumstance. Additionally, 
increasing young girls’ (and their families’) awareness of economic opportunity and 
the potential for financial independence through education and employment will 
 
42 Huck-ju Kwon and Ilcheong Yi, “Economic Development and Poverty Reduction in Korea: 
Governing Multifunctional Institutions,” Institute for Future Studies and Swedish Institute for 
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further disincentivize early marriage. With increased knowledge of both their earning 
potential and employment opportunity, child marriage might not seem like the best 
available option for these girls and their families. Stressing not only the immediate, 
but also the future economic benefits of education and employment will be crucial for 
successfully altering these beliefs and norms. Programs like Ishraq (Egypt) and 
PRACHAR (India) are examples of such educational/empowerment initiatives in 
practice. These programs have been found to be effective in not only empowering 
girls with information, but also in changing wider, community attitudes and behavior 
related to female economic opportunity and child marriage.43 Expansions on such 
programs are necessary. 
Equally important is the concerted effort to support and create productive job 
opportunities for women. Coupled with investments in education, job creation is 
crucial to both eliminating poverty and changing economic attitudes of girls and 
community members. Jobs, of course, provide essential income and empower 
individuals—especially young women.44 Informing girls and their families of the 
myriad opportunities in self-employment, government/bureaucratic capacities, and 
the private sector is essential to altering their economic beliefs. Governments can 
incentivize private businesses and companies to offer jobs to young women, and 
particularly those in rural areas, through tax incentives or direct employee salary 
subsidies. Compliance with and enforcement of anti-discrimination employment laws, 
which exist in each of the countries I mentioned in the introduction, as well as many 
others, will be crucial for economic and attitudinal progress. 
Finally, ensuring adequate political access, participation, and representation of 
marginalized groups is crucial to escaping poverty and child marriage, as well as 
altering ‘traditional’ gender roles. Having diverse (and effective) governments and 
bureaucratic institutions is essential for economic development and policymaking. 
Involving women and other underrepresented groups in governmental and political 
processes increases their decision-making ability and agency. Furthermore, greater 
female involvement in political capacities increases the likelihood of investment in 
social programs and services, including education and other welfare benefits 
programs.45 
 
iii. A Note Regarding Enforcement 
 
43 Anju Malhotra et al., “Solutions to End Child Marriage: What the Evidence Shows,” International 
Center for Research on Women (2011): 12. https://www.healthynewbornnetwork.org/.  
44 “Employment and Decent Work,” United Nations, accessed December 1, 2020, 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/socialperspectiveondevelopment/issues/employment-and-
decent-work.html.  
45 Parsons et al., 14. 
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 Once again, in many countries, there already exist legal and policy frameworks 
at the national and local levels which prohibit child marriage. But, in order to put an 
end to the practice, these frameworks, coupled with the initiatives I’ve offered above, 
need to be introduced in conjunction with more consistent enforcement mechanisms 
and, potentially, harsher punitive measures. While I concede that enforcement in this 
negative sense—that is, through limitation, regulation, and hardline punitive 
measures—is not necessarily effective (take, for example, the United States’ war on 
drugs, which hasn’t entirely eliminated the market in illegal drugs), governments need 
to commit money and resources for oversight in often-ignored communities, and 
particularly rural and remote areas, to root out child marriage. In addition, corrupt 
practices to obtain special access or privilege—like hush-money payments to 
government officials or law enforcement, for example—need to desist for effective 
implementation to take place. 
The World Bank reported that if Niger had been able to completely eliminate 
child marriage in 2015, then by 2030 it would have accrued up to $1.7 billion in 
additional welfare, $327 million in savings for its education budget, and $34 million in 
savings through reduced infant mortality. Based on these sample estimates alone, 
governments themselves should be incentivized and motivated to make concerted 
efforts to decrease the prevalence of child marriage.46 The potential economic benefits 
are massive. 
 Child marriage is undoubtedly a social and human rights issue, but my aim in 
this section was to illustrate the numerous ways in which the practice translates into 
an economic issue, as well. The policy proposals I have offered in this section will 
certainly require time, cooperation, and (a lot of) money. But, as I hope to have 
shown, there is reason to believe that developing countries that engage in these efforts 
will be rewarded through sizable economic gains and increased productivity. Being 
able to reinvest these savings and net gains into communities, educational endeavors, 
and other social/welfare programs will assist in fully eradicating the practice of child 




In this paper, I have analyzed many of the distinct harms resulting from the 
seemingly elusive market(s) in child marriage and have argued that such a market 
sufficiently satisfies each of the conditions which characterize noxious markets in 
Debra Satz’s view. I have also identified economic motivators which feed into the 
prevalence of markets in child marriage, including poverty and misguided prudential 
 
46 Quentin Wodon et al., “Economic Impacts of Child Marriage: Global Synthesis Report,” The 
World Bank (June 2017): 38-42. http://documents1.worldbank.org/.  
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beliefs. While the current rate of child marriage is undoubtedly alarming, I would be 
remiss if I failed to recognize and emphasize the important steps already taken by 
many governments, NGOs, and advocacy groups across the world to reduce the 
incidence of the practice and to mitigate the inevitable harms rooted in this 
institution. Many South Asian countries, including India and Bangladesh, have 
implemented national and state-specific action plans in an effort to change social 
norms and attitudes, empower girls through education, and make apparent the distinct 
harms caused by child marriage.47 NGOs like the UN and UNICEF, as well as 
advocacy groups like Girls Not Brides, have also done important work in ensuring 
that governments continue to strive to protect and promote the well-being of girls 
susceptible to child marriage. 
 Finally, as I have hinted in the previous section, I think there is much to be 
gained from attempting to understand the weight and force of the many institutions 
and motivations acting against the complete abolishment of child marriage. Grappling 
with the influences of the economic drivers of the market in child marriage is an 
important step, but analyzing the social, cultural, attitudinal, and religious forces 
prodding the market is an equally important task in better understanding the 
challenges which governments and policymakers face in eradicating child marriage. 
For example, marriage can be a deeply religious ritual; child marriage might even be 
considered a requirement, of sorts, in some religious communities, leading to 
resistance in complying with governmental efforts to eliminate the practice. Further 
issues and complexities arise in theocratic regimes and states; while countries like 
India and Bangladesh have secular, liberal governments, challenges arise where the 
values to human rights and related agreements and conventions simply do not 
supersede religious aims and cultural norms. Further questions and discourse lie in 
determining how clear human rights violations, like markets in child marriage, are 
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